Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information

Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort

No 167, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

JEL-codes: D82 G14 G32 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (104)

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Journal Article: Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:637

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