Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market
Bruno Biais (),
Christophe Bisière () and
No 543, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse
We experimentally analyze equilibrium discovery in i) a pure call auction, ii) a call auction preceded by a nonbinding preopening period, and iii) a call auction preceded by a binding preopening period. We examine whether a preopening period can facilitate coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. During the nonbinding preopening period, traders tend to place manipulative orders. After observing such orders, participants learn to distrust cheap talk and coordinate less on Pareto dominant outcomes. In contrast, we find that, when preopening orders are binding, they improve the ability to coordinate on high gains from trade.
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Journal Article: Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market (2014)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:7534
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