When and why does it pay to be green?

Stefan Ambec and Paul Lanoie ()
Additional contact information
Paul Lanoie: IEA, HEC Montréal, http://www.hec.ca/iea/

No 07-04, Cahiers de recherche from HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée

Keywords: Environmental policy; innovation; Porter hypothesis; environmental regulation; pollution; capital market; green products. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ino, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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http://www.hec.ca/iea/cahiers/2007/iea0704_planoie.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: When and Why Does it Pay to be Green? (2007)
Working Paper: When and Why Does It Pay To Be Green? (2007)
Working Paper: When and why does it pay to be green ? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iea:carech:0704

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