Collective bargaining and regional wage differences in Spain: An empirical analysis
Hipólito J. Simón (),
Raul Ramos and
Esteban Sanroma
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Hipólito J. Simón: Instituto de Economía Internacional; Universidad de Alicante
No 2005/7, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)
Abstract:
This article analyses the importance of labour market institutions and, in particular, collective wage bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. Using microdata from the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey, our results reveal that there are significant inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences are present throughout the whole wage structure and can be explained by both competitive and non-competitive factors, such as an insufficient competition in product markets. In this context, industry-level collective bargaining plays a major role in accounting for regional wage differences, a role that in the Spanish case is enhanced due to its unusual regional dimension.
Keywords: Collective bargaining; Regional wage differences; Wage structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
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Journal Article: Collective bargaining and regional wage differences in Spain: an empirical analysis (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2005-7
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