Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting

Jun-ichi Itaya (), Makoto Okamuraz () and Chikara Yamaguchix ()
Additional contact information
Makoto Okamuraz: Hiroshima University
Chikara Yamaguchix: Hiroshima Shudo University

No 2009/15, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable.

Keywords: Partial tax coordination; repeated game; tax competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting (2014)
Working Paper: Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting (2010)
Working Paper: Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-15

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