In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization

Jenny Ligthart and Peter van Oudheusden

No 2011/24, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: We measure the contribution of fiscal decentralization to trust in government. Using repeated cross-country survey data of individuals on several measures of trust in government over the 1994{2007 period, we estimate an ordered response model of the government trust and fiscal decentralization nexus. We control for unobserved country characteristics, macroeconomic determinants, and individual characteristics. Our main finding is that fiscal decentralization increases trust in government. More specifically, a one percentage point increase in fiscal decentralization causes roughly a four-fifths of a percentage point increase in government trust. The beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government is neither limited to nor necessarily large for relatively decentralized countries.

Keywords: fiscal decentralization; government trust; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H11 H70 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: In government we trust: The role of fiscal decentralization (2015)
Working Paper: In Government We Trust: The Role of Fiscal Decentralization (2011)
Working Paper: In Government We Trust: The Role of Fiscal Decentralization (2011)
Working Paper: In Government We Trust: The Role of Fiscal Decentralization (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2011-24

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