The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007

Raul Caruso (), Jacopo Costa and Roberto Ricciuti
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Jacopo Costa: University of Florence

No 2011/26, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: In this paper we empirically analyze the socio-economic determinants of the existence of military dictatorships in Africa. A recent literature in political economy analyses the relationship between the civil undemocratic government and the military as an agency problem: the civilian government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d’état and seize power. These papers derive three main causes of military rule: income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and external threat. We empirically analyze these issues by estimating the probability that a country experiences a military rule. We consider 48 African countries over the period 1970-2007.

Keywords: dictatorship; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 P48 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Probability of Military Rule in Africa, 1970-2007 (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2011-26

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