Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative

Federico Boffa and John Panzar ()
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John Panzar: University of Auckland

No 2011/38, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries in which the upstream “bottleneck” segment faces significant returns to scale while other (downstream) segments may be more competitive. In the proposed mechanism, the ownership of the upstream firm is allocated to downstream firms in proportion to their shares of input purchases. This mechanism, while preserving downstream competition, partially internalizes the benefits of exploiting economies of scale resulting from an increase in downstream output. We show that this mechanism is more efficient than a disintegrated market structure in which the upstream natural monopoly bottleneck sets a price equal to average cost.

Keywords: Regulation; vertically related industries; co-ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2011-38

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