Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from Italy

Leonzio Rizzo () and Alberto Zanardi ()
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Leonzio Rizzo: Università di Ferrara & IEB
Alberto Zanardi: Università di Bologna & Econopubblica-Bocconi

No 2012/33, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: We use data for all Italian municipalities, from 2001-2006, to empirically test the extent to which two electoral rules, which hold, for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single ballot plurality rule while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected.

Keywords: Federal budget; double ballot; coalition; list; taxes; expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H3 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2012-33

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