Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion

Amedeo Piolatto

No 2014/9, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: With direct incentives and sanctions being the most common instruments to fight tax evasion, the theoretical literature has tended to overlook indirect schemes, such as itemised deductions, in which one agent has an interest in other agents declaring their revenue. Itemised deductions provide an incentive for consumers to declare their purchases, and this forces sellers to do the same. I show that it is possible to increase tax proceeds by choosing a suitable level of itemised deduction, and this, for any level of taxation. Indeed, the cost for the government on the consumers' side is more than compensated for by the extra proceeds generated on the sellers' side.

Keywords: Tax evasion; itemised deductions; substitute goods; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 H20 H26 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2014-IEB-WorkingPaper-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion (2015)
Journal Article: Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion (2015)
Working Paper: Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion (2010)
Working Paper: Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion (2010)
Working Paper: Tax evasion and deductible expenses (2008)
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