Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability

Gianmarco Daniele

No 2015/37, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.

Keywords: Political selection; organized crime; politicians’ ability; human capital; spillover effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H7 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability (2019)
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