Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government dissolutions on electoral outcomes in southern Italian municipalities

Gianmarco Daniele and Benny Geys

No 2015/41, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: Since 1991, the Italian national government can dissolve municipal councils when infiltration by organized crime is suspected (Law 164/1991). We exploit variation over time and space in the application of this law to study voters’ responses to politicians’ publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that public exposure of ties to organized crime significantly depresses turnout in local elections, and negatively impacts the electoral performance of incumbents and purely local political parties. The breach in the local political principal-agent relationship also translates into citizens’ reduced willingness to contribute to the financing of local public goods.

Keywords: Political accountability; voter turnout; elections; mafia; tax compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H89 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2015-41

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