Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?
Marta Curto‐Grau (),
Albert Solé‐Ollé () and
Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro ()
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Marta Curto‐Grau: University of Heidelberg & IEB
Albert Solé‐Ollé: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB
Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Albert Solé-Ollé ()
No 2017/04, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)
We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co‐partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re‐election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995‐2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference‐in‐differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable.
Keywords: Political parties; intergovernmental transfers; distributive politics; regression discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C2 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2017-04
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