When developers hold office: Shaping housing supply through local polítics

Ghizlen Ouasbaa (), Albert Solé-Ollé () and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal ()
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Ghizlen Ouasbaa: Pompeu Fabra & IEB
Albert Solé-Ollé: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB
Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB & CEPR

No 2025/05, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: We examine the impact of city council members with real estate backgrounds on housing supply in California 1995-2019. Using candidate occupation data and a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a developer increases approved housing units by 68% during their term. This effect fades after one term, suggesting developers influence zoning decisions more than long-term policy change. Analysis of votes extracted from council meetings shows they are especially effective in securing discretionary zoning approvals. Importantly, we find no evidence of electoral backlash, suggesting voters are generally supportive of housing expansion led by pro-development candidates.

Keywords: Land-use Policies; Housing Market; Interest Groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P00 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 70 pages
Date: 2025
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