Byoung Jun () and
No 503, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly pro?ts, the incumbent(s) may want to signal its weakness to invite entry of weaker firms
JEL-codes: D42 D43 D82 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Anti-Limit Pricing (2010)
Working Paper: Anti-Limit Pricing (2005)
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