Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening

Helena Hye-Young Kim (helena@korea.ac.kr), Frans Spinnewyn and Luc Lauwers
Additional contact information
Helena Hye-Young Kim: Department of Economics, Korea University
Frans Spinnewyn: Department of Economic, K.U.Leuven

No 710, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a game of incomplete information. It is shown that if types are uniformly distributed, then a three stage sequential game with an exogenously given probability of a terminal break down cannot be improved upon within a restricted class of models.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Efficiency; Risk Limit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w0710.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:0710

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kim, Jisoo (zisu07@gmail.com).