Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach
Biung-Ghi Ju ()
No 717, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University
We introduce a notion of conditionally decisive powers of which the exercise depends on social consent. Decisive powers, or the so-called libertarian rights, are examples and much weaker forms of powers are covered by our notion. We provide an axiomatic characterization of existence of a system of powers and its uniqueness as well as characterizations of various families of rules represented by systems of powers. Critical axioms are monotonicity, independence, and symmetric linkage (person i and i's issues should be treated symmetrically to person j and j's issues for at least one linkage between issues and persons).
Keywords: Powers; Consent; Libertarian Rights; Monotonicity; Independence; Symmetric linkage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach (2010)
Working Paper: Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:0717
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