Learning a Population Distribution

Seung Han Yoo

No 1401, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes' rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each player's strategy is a function not only of the player's type but also of experience. Second, we show that each player's initial belief about the population distribution converges almost surely to a "correct" belief.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Dynamic games; Bayesian learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Learning a population distribution (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:1401

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