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Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions:Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity

Biung-Ghi Ju () and Seung Han Yoo

No 1802, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: We examine free riding for entry deterrence in license auctions with heterogeneous incumbents. We establish the monotonicity of randomized preemptive bidding equilibria: an incumbent with a higher entry-loss rate has greater free-riding incentive, choosing a lower deterring probability. We then identify conditions for the existence of a series of fully or partially participating equilibria such that two or more incumbents with bounded heterogeneity in their entry-loss rates participate in randomized preemptive bidding. As an application, we examine a simple case of a bipartite group of participating incumbents consisting of one "leader" and many "followers". We show that the policy of limiting the leader's participation (set-asides for entrants, limiting participation of incumbents with excessive market shares, etc.) may or may not increase entry probability.

Keywords: entry deterrence; free-rider problem; asymmetric auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity (2022) Downloads
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