Optimal robust allocation of private goods

Kiho Yoon

No 1803, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players' payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.

Keywords: robust mechanism design; dominant strategy; budget balance; ex-post individual rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w1803.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:1803

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kim, Jisoo ().