Upstream competition, exclusive content provision, and vertical integration in media markets
Kiho Yoon ()
No 2009, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University
With a multilateral vertical contracting model, we examine the contractual form and the vertical structure in media markets. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream competition by the Hotelling location model. We show that the possibility of exclusive contracts rises when the value of the premium content increases, the degree of horizontal differentiation in the downstream market decreases, the importance of advertising revenue decreases, and the relative bargaining power of upstream firm decreases. We also show that vertical separation (full vertical integration, respectively) is plausible when the relative bargaining power of upstream firm is strong (weak, respectively).
Keywords: content provision; exclusive contract; vertical integration; media market; video programming. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L42 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-cul, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:2009
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