Household Negotiation and Labor Supply: Evidence from the BHPS

Andrew Clark, Hélène Couprie () and Catherine Sofer ()

No 201, IDEP Working Papers from Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France

Abstract: In this paper, we estimate a collective model of household labour supply à la Chiappori on British two-earner couples, using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We find that family members do not pool their resources: the unitary model is rejected. We estimate a sharing rule representing the negotiation process inside the household, introducing a number of original distribution factors, such as political and religious involvement and parents’ occupational level. We do not find any significant impact of marriage market opportunities on the balance of power inside the couple. We emphasise that the sharing rule should be interpreted carefully when analysing intra-family inequality issues.

Keywords: Labour Supply; Collective Model; Sharing Rule; Marriage Market. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 C71 D10 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2002-05-24, Revised 2002-05-24
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iep:wpidep:0201

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