Freedom of Choice in a Social Context: Comparing Games Forms

Sebastian Bervoets

No 503, IDEP Working Papers from Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France

Abstract: In this paper we introduce the set of outcomes of game forms as the relevant attribute for evaluating freedom of choice. These sets are defined as the cartesian product of every individual’s set of available options. It is argued that doing so is one way of taking into account social interactions when evaluating individual freedom. A set of axioms is introduced that convey some intuitions about how interactions affect freedom of choice. Using these axioms, two criteria are characterized for comparing game forms in terms of the freedom of choice they offer, the Max and the MaxMin. These criteria are based respectively on the comparison of the best and the worse outcome the individual can reach in the game form.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2005-01, Revised 2005-01
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Journal Article: Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms (2007)
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