Characterizations of the Existence of Nash Equilibria with Non-convex Strategy Sets

Rabia Nessah () and Kristiaan Kerstens

No 2008-ECO-13, Working Papers from IESEG School of Management

Abstract: A sufficient and necessary condition is presented for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in n-person noncooperative games in normal form where strategy sets are not necessarily convex. Under the convexity condition, we show that this new sufficient and necessary condition is a particular case of diagonal transfer quasiconcavity. The result is illustrated with an application to an economy with multilateral environmental externalities and to the existence of a Cournot equilibrium.

Keywords: Noncooperative game; Nash equilibrium; convexity condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2008-09
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