Inferring Welfare from Observed Choices: An Axiomatic Approach

Guilhem Lecouteux and Ivan Mitrouchev ()
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Guilhem Lecouteux: Université Côte d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG UMR 7321, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne, France
Ivan Mitrouchev: IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France

Working Papers from IESEG School of Management

Abstract: Welfare economics lacks a consensus on how to infer welfare from inconsistent choices. We argue that the di?erent approaches proposed in the literature rely on a set of values endorsed by welfare economists, de?ned as axioms about the structure of normative preferences and their relation to individual choices. We identify four main axioms: (i) normative individualism, (ii) choice context-independence, (iii) normative context-independence, and (iv) consumer sovereignty, which are satis?ed in standard welfare economics. These axioms however become potentially incompatible when preferences are context-dependent. We show that focusing on the principles which guide welfare economists to elicit welfare from inconsistent choices open promising perspectives of research at the intersection of behavioural welfare economics and social choice theory.

Keywords: welfare; –; choice; –; preference; –; context; –; values; –; social; choice; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 D71 D90 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2023-08
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