State Government Cash and In-kind Benefits: Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Cross-Program Substitution

James Marton and David Wildasin

No 2006-01, Working Papers from University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations

Abstract: US states provide both cash and health insurance benefits for the poor, partially financed by fiscal transfers from the Federal government. The 1996 welfare reform drastically reduces Federal support for cash transfers at the margin, lowering the relative price to states of providing benefits to the poor through Medicaid. This paper analyzes the comparative-statics response of state governments to such changes in intergovernmental transfers, showing (in central cases) that they can contribute not only to reductions in state expenditures on cash benefits but to increases in expenditures on Medicaid, whether or not beneficiary populations are mobile among states. Length: 27 pages

Keywords: Intergovernmental Transfers; Welfare Reform; Medicaid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: State government cash and in-kind benefits: Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and cross-program substitution (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-01

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