Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending
Matz Dahlberg (),
Eva Mörk (),
Jorn Rattso and
No 2006-12, Working Papers from University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations
When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor affecting local governments; federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of local governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds is used as an exclusion restriction in an IV-estimation. We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates. Our results thus confirm a flypaper effect for Sweden.
Keywords: Fiscal federalism; grants; flypaper effect; local taxation; local government expenditure; causal effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H71 H77 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending (2008)
Working Paper: Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending (2006)
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