The U-shaped relationship between vertical integration and competition: theory and evidence

Philippe Aghion, Rachel Griffith and Peter Howitt ()
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Peter Howitt: Institute for Fiscal Studies and Brown University

No W06/12, IFS Working Papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: This paper considers how competition can affect aggregate innovative activity through its effects on firms' decision whether or not to vertically integrate. A moderate increase in competition enhances innovation incentives, too much competition discourages innovative effort. These effects generates an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation and between competition and the incentive to vertically integrate. Preliminary evidence finds that there is a non-linear relationship between competition and the propensity of firms to vertically integrate. These results seem to be more consistent with the Property Right Theory (PRT) of vertical integration than with the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach.

Pages: 16 pp.
Date: 2006-06-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: U‐shaped relationship between vertical integration and competition: Theory and evidence (2006)
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