Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence

Timothy Besley and Ian Preston

No W07/06, IFS Working Papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract:

This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.

Pages: 44 pp.
Date: 2007-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (66)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence (2007)
Working Paper: Electoral Bias and Policy Choice:Theory and Evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence (2006)
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