Non cooperative household demand

Valérie Lechene (v.lechene@ucl.ac.uk) and Ian Preston

No W08/14, IFS Working Papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract:

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Intra-household allocation; Slutsky symmetry. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Noncooperative household demand (2011)
Working Paper: Non cooperative household demand (2010)
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