Voluntary disclosure schemes for offshore tax evasion
Matthew Rablen () and
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Matthew Gould: Institute for Fiscal Studies
No W18/07, IFS Working Papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies
Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such schemes are typically designed retrospectively following the bulk acquisition of information on offshore holdings, such as the recent ?Paradise? and ?Panama? papers. They offer an opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced fine rates for truthful disclosure. We characterize the taxpayer/tax authority game with and without a scheme and show that a scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal offshore investment, increases onshore investment, and could either increase or decrease total offshore investment (legal plus illegal).
Keywords: voluntary disclosure; offshore tax evasion; tax amnesty; third-party information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-law and nep-pbe
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Working Paper: Voluntary Disclosure Schemes for Offshore Tax Evasion (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:18/07
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