A Theory of Power Wars

Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli (massimo.morelli@unibocconi.it) and Salvatore Nunnari

No 669, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: We present a theory of war onset and war duration in which power is multidimensional and can evolve through conflict. The resources players can secure withoutfighting are determined by their political power, while the ability of appropriating resources with violence is due to their military power. When deciding whether to wage a war, players evaluate the consequences on the current allocation of resources as well as on the future distribution of military and political power. We deliver three main results: a key driver of war is the mismatch between military and political power; dynamic incentives may amplify static incentives, leading forward-looking players to be more belligerent; and a war is more likely to last for longer if political power is initially more unbalanced than military power and the politically under-represented player is militarily advantaged. Our results are robust to allowing the peaceful allocation of resources to be a function of both political and military power. Finally, we provide empirical correlations on inter-state wars that are consistent with the theory. Keywords: Formal Model; International Relations; Causes of War; Dynamic Game; War Onset; War Duration; Balance of Power; Power Mismatch; Power Shift; Civil Wars; Inter-State Wars

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/wp/2020/669.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Power Wars (2022)
Working Paper: A Theory of Power Wars (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:669

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://repec.unibocconi.it/igier/igi/
igier@unibocconi.it

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University via Rontgen, 1 - 20136 Milano (Italy).
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (igier@unibocconi.it).