Cooperation and Wealth

Oded Stark

No 123, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from playing a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Individuals who are hardwired as cooperators or defectors are randomly matched into pairs, and cooperators are able to perfectly find out the type of a partner to a game by incurring a recognition cost. We show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators relates negatively to the population’s level of wealth.

Keywords: Equilibrium fraction of cooperators; Population's level of wealth; Single-shot prisoner's dilemma game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2002-10
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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1458 First version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation and wealth (2004)
Working Paper: COOPERATION AND WEALTH (2003)
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