Dynamical Modeling of the Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma
Victor Dorofeenko and
Jamsheed Shorish
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Victor Dorofeenko: Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
No 124, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies
Abstract:
Epstein (1998) demonstrates that in the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game it is possible to sustain cooperation in a repeated game played on a finite grid, where agents are spatially distributed and of fixed strategy type ('cooperate' or 'defect'). We introduce a methodology to formalize the dynamical equations for a population of agents distributed in space and in wealth, which form a system similar to the reaction-diffusion type. We determine conditions for stable zones of sustained cooperation in a one-dimensional version of the model. Defectors are forced out of cooperation zones due to a congestion effect, and accumulate at the boundaries.
Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma; Demographic; Active media; Reaction-diffusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2002-11
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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1459 First version, 2002 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamical Modeling of the Demographic Prisoner’s Dilemma (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:124
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