Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy

Claudia Keser
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Claudia Keser: University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute

No 3, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1995-01
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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/809 First version, 1995 (application/pdf)

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