Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity
Carlos Alós-Ferrer () and
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Klaus Ritzberger: Royal Holloway, University of London
No 332, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), arbitrary specifications of patience or impatience (geometric, hyperbolic, or otherwise), externalities, multiple selves, and other-regarding preferences.
Keywords: bargaining; equilibrium existence; infinite-horizon games; subgame perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:332
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