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Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity

Carlos Alós-Ferrer () and Klaus Ritzberger
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Klaus Ritzberger: Royal Holloway, University of London

No 332, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), arbitrary specifications of patience or impatience (geometric, hyperbolic, or otherwise), externalities, multiple selves, and other-regarding preferences.

Keywords: bargaining; equilibrium existence; infinite-horizon games; subgame perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-332.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:332

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