Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism

Oded Stark

No 67, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.

Keywords: Evolution of altruism; One-shot prisoner's dilemma game; Siblings and strangers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1999-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1173 First version, 1999 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Siblings, strangers, and the surge of altruism (1999)
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