Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Kimberly Elliott

No PB03-03, Policy Briefs from Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: Almost a decade ago, as the last nuclear crisis with North Korea was reaching a peak, I concluded the following about the potential utility of economic sanctions: The debate over US policy toward North Korea boils down to one deceptively simple question: what does Kim Il-sung want? No one can be sure of the answer and different interpretations have quite different policy implications. If the Great Leader views a nuclear weapons option as important to the survival of his regime, economic sanctions are unlikely to force him to give it up. But if he views the threat of developing nuclear weapons as a bargain-ing chip, some combination of carrots and sticks may induce him to trade it away.

Date: 2003-04
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