Developing Countries Can Help Restore the WTO's Dispute Settlement System

Anabel González () and Euijin Jung ()
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Anabel González: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Euijin Jung: Peterson Institute for International Economics

No PB20-1, Policy Briefs from Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: By refusing to fill vacancies in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body—the top body that hears appeals and rules on trade disputes--the Trump administration has paralyzed the key component of the dispute settlement system. No nation or group of nations has more at stake in salvaging this system than the world's big emerging-market economies: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand, among others. These countries have actively and successfully used the dispute settlement system to defend their commercial interests abroad and resolve inevitable trade conflicts. The authors suggest that even though the developing countries did not create the Appellate Body crisis, they may hold a key to unlock it. The Trump administration has also focused its ire on a longstanding WTO practice of giving these economies latitude to seek "special and differential treatment" in trade negotiations because of their developing-country status. The largest developing economies, which have a significant stake in preserving a two-step, rules-based mechanism for resolving trade disputes, could play a role in driving a potential bargain to save the appeals mechanism. They could unite to give up that special status in return for a US commitment to end its boycott of the nomination of Appellate Body members.

Date: 2020-01
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