Lessons from three global collective action problems

Kimberly Clausing

No WP26-6, Working Paper Series from Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: This paper compares three global collective action problems, those involving climate change, international trade, and international taxation. First, each problem is assessed in terms of fundamental elements that stymie global collective action: concentrated interests that deter action in the face of larger yet diffuse benefits, cross-jurisdictional policy spillovers, and free-rider incentives at the jurisdictional level. Second, each problem is assessed in terms of four key elements that help address global collective action problems: (i) broad understanding of the policy problem, (ii) formation of a coalition willing to take policy action, (iii) enforcement mechanisms that incentivize policy adoption and protect adopters from nonadopters, and (iv) leadership. The paper concludes by discussing lessons from the three global collective action problems, set in the context of contemporary geopolitical developments. Although all solution elements are important, adequate incentive mechanisms are a pivotal factor in resolving global collective action problems; such mechanisms can also strengthen global collective efforts in the face of would-be spoilers.

Keywords: climate policy; international tax; international trade; global collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H73 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2 ... tive-action-problems (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp26-6

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Peterson Institute for International Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peterson Institute webmaster ().