Aristotle’s Politics: On Constitutions, Justice, Laws and Stability

Krishna K Ladha
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Krishna K Ladha: Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode

No 104, Working papers from Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode

Abstract: Aristotle's Politics can be divided into two inquiries, each amenable to mathematical representation. The first inquiry assumes, probably idealistically, that individuals act in the collective interest and leads to the following theorem: polity (a rule of many good men) is better than aristocracy (few good men), and aristocracy is better than monarchy (one good man). The second inquiry assumes, more realistically, that individuals act in self-interest and leads to the following theorem as a justification for democracy: Among various systems of government, democracy (a mixed constitution with a rule of law sustained by competing factions) offers the best prospect to deliver two things at once: justice (pursuit of the common interest) and stability (obedience of the rule of law). The latter theorem implies that institutionalization of competing factions governed by good laws is likely to be just and stable. It applies to nations, corporations and towns facing the tragedy of the commons, externalities and reneging.

Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-pol
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