Can decentralized forest governance mitigate domination by state and local elites? Evidence from India’s Shiwaliks

Kulbhushan Balooni (), Chetan Kumar and Makoto Inoue
Additional contact information
Kulbhushan Balooni: Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode
Chetan Kumar: University of Cambridge
Makoto Inoue: The University of Tokyo

No 49, Working papers from Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode

Abstract: Reluctance of the state to relinquish control, and appropriation of benefits by local elites, are two key factors affecting the success of decentralized forest governance in developing countries. We provide empirical details on how these two dominant actors affect the functioning of village institutions created under decentralization initiatives. We examined the experiences of two prominent Hill Resource Management Societies in India’s Shiwalik hills and found that the performance of these institutions depends critically on the role of local elites. The strength of their positioning determines the state’s ability to obstruct decentralization processes and to appropriate benefits from forests.

Pages: 1 page
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://iimk.ac.in/websiteadmin/FacultyPublication ... ers/49fullp.pdf?t=45 First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iik:wpaper:49

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode IIMK Campus PO, Kunnamanagalam, Kozhikode, Kerala, India -673570. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sudheesh Kumar ().