Mathematical Modelling for Time-of-Use Pricing of Electricity in Monopoly and Oligopoly

Nidhi Kaicker, Goutam Dutta, Debamanyu Das and Subhashree Banerjee

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: This study establishes the feasibility condition for efficiency gains to arise from time-of-use pricing in the electricity market in a monopolistic and oligopolistic set up using constrained optimization. In an oligopolistic set-up, the strategic interaction between producers depends on the level of demand. In case of high demand, the producers compete on the basis of output they will produce, resulting in a Cournot-type competition. On the other hand, in case of low demand, an oligopolistic structure may break with only the most efficient firm operating, or results in the emergence of leader firms and follower firms, i.e. the Stackleberg model.

Date: 2017-10-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ene
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iima.ac.in/sites/default/files/rnpfiles/2124064372017-10-01.pdf English Version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:14580

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().