Bargaining with a Variable Population for Games with a Reference Point

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: We consider axiomatic models of bargaining defined over a domain of problems containing different numbers of agents, define a concept called restricted monotonicity with respect of changes in the number of agents, and show that a solution due to Lahiri (1988), which satisfies monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point, meets the aforementioned requirement. Finally, we consider a class of solutions which are defined with respect to a reference point [concept due to Thomson (1981)] and show that this class satisfies our axiom of restricted monotonicity.

Date: 1988-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00849

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().