Coalitional Fairness and Distortion of Utilities
Somdeb Lahiri ()
No WP1989-01-01_00857, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department
Given a finite number of agents with utilities who wish to divide a finite number of commodities, consider the non-cooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are coalitionally fair solutions to the underlying equity problem determined by the strategies used. It is shown that for such a game any equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is a Nash equilibrium outcome for the non-cooperative game.
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