Independence of Irrelevant Transfers

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a partial geometric characterization of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Axiom, called Independence of Irrelevant Transfers (IIT) as also a characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution without the IIA Axiom. The characterization has been motivated by the work of Shapley (1969) and Thomson (1981) to a very great extent and contributes to the growing literature on bargaining solutions without the IIA Axiom.

Date: 1989-10-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00905

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