Egalitarian Departures from the Ideal Point

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we propose a new solution to bargaining or group decision problems, which requires an arbitrator to choose that point on the Pareto frontier of the feasible set where losses in utility from the ideal point are equal for all the agents. The solution is motivated by ones already existing in the literature. We then present two modes of characterizing this solution which uses familiar axioms in bargaining theory and also some axioms which are intuitively plausible variants of those existing in the literature. The two key axioms are Independence of Common Monotone Transformation modulo the Ideal Point and Redundancy of Additional Alternatives Other Than a Reference Point.

Date: 1989-11-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00906

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