Threat Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information and Correlated Beliefs

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with incomplete information and correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. The approach adds a dose of realism to the already existing literature on threat bargaining games.

Date: 1990-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00916

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