Arbitration by a Bayesian Statistician and Bounded Rationality

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we formalize the framework of an arbitration game, to accommodate a large class of situations where public decisions are implemented in a noncooperative setting. We then present a method of computing the equilibrium strategies of the players under assumptions of bounded rationality, so that the solutions correspond to what is observed in any realization of an arbitration game.

Date: 1990-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00925

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