The Revelation Principle for Arbitration Games

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we prove the validity of the revelation principle for arbitration games and also establish that a large class of game forms can be represented as a Bayesian Statistician. This adds force and appeal to the concept of an arbitration game.

Date: 1990-03-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00931

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